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Abstract
This study used the Valence-Expectancy Learning model, a mathematical

cognitive model, to dissect young adult performance on the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT).
Drinking behavior and monetary incentive were examined as predictors of performance
on the IGT. No differences were found among groups when data were analyzed using
traditional behavioral analyses. However, when the Expectancy-Valence Learning model
was applied to the data, differences between groups were found related to attention and
choice consistency. Importantly, the cognitive model was not a good fit for fifty-seven
percent of the data, meaning that it did not succeed in explaining how the participants’
choices were dependent on trial-by-trial feedback. This may indicate that many young
adults in this study were not invested in the task.
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Cognitive modeling analysis of decision-making processes in young adults
at-risk and not at-risk for alcohol dependence

Human adolescence is a transitional period between youth and adulthood in which
many developmental changes take place. Spear (2000) suggests that developmental
events in the brain encourage many of the behavioral strategies seen in adolescence,
including increased risk-taking and novelty-seeking. Indeed, substantial evidence
indicates that the brain continues to develop throughout adolescence into early adulthood,
particularly in regions thought to be responsible for decision-making (Giedd et al., 1996;
Mukherjee, et al., 2002; Sowell, Thompson, Holmes, Jernigan, & Toga, 1999; Sowell,
Thompson, Tessner, & Toga, 2001). Studies have pointed to the prefrontal cortex (PFC)
as being a key component of decision-making (Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, &
Anderson, 1994; Bechara, Damasio, & Damasio, 2000; Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, &
Anderson, 1998; Bechara, et al., 2001; Blair, Colledge, & Mitchell, 2001; Bunge, et al.,
2002; Hooper, Luciana, Conklin, & Yarger, 2004; Elliot, Dolan, & Frith, 2000).
Developmental and functional neuroimaging research supports continued prefrontal
development during adolescence (Hooper, et al., 2004). Therefore, it is possible that the
increased risk-taking seen in adolescence compared to older adults is due to a relatively
underdeveloped PFC.
The pattern of decision making seen in adolescence leads to high levels of
morbidity and mortality (Eaton et al., 2006, Steinberg, 2004). More than fifty-percent of
adolescents engage in drunk driving, the use of illegal drugs, sex without contraception or
protection, and minor criminal activities (Maggs, Almeida, & Galambos, 1995). Some
researchers suggest that increased levels of novelty-seeking during this time period may
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be evolutionarily adaptive because it promotes learning (Ernst & Paulus, 2005).
However, there are high societal costs of dangerous adolescent activities, including
disease, injury, human suffering, and associated economic costs (Reyna & Farley, 2006,
Steinberg, 2007). Therefore, a better understanding of the components of decisionmaking during adolescence could help in formulating better tactics for reducing
dangerous risk-taking behaviors.
Decision-making is broadly defined as the process of forming preferences,
selecting and executing actions, and evaluating outcomes (Ernst & Paulus, 2005). Ernst
and Paulus (2005) break down decision-making into a series of steps that follow an inputprocess-output-feedback structure. According to these researchers; “Input refers to the
presentation of stimuli, each predicting a measurable rewarding or aversive outcome;
process refers to the appraisal of these stimuli and formation of preference; output refers
to the action carried out in response to the selected stimulus. Feedback is the experience
and evaluation of the outcome that follows that action perpetuated on the selected
stimulus” (p. 597). Evaluating these individual steps in the decision-making process may
help isolate which aspect of decision-making is affected in various disorders (Ernst &
Paulus, 2005).
One such population in which this input-process-output-feedback analysis has
been helpful is with patients who are substance-dependent. These individuals generally
display decision-making patterns that are different from those of their non-substancedependent counterparts. For one, substance-dependent individuals tend to display a
hypersensitivity to reward, choosing high immediate gains despite higher future losses
(Bechara & Damasio, 2002a). Secondly, substance-dependent individuals tend to
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inaccurately evaluate the probability and magnitude of positive or negative potential
outcomes (Rogers and Robins, 2001). Also, substance-dependent individuals are more
likely to select relatively riskier options than non-substance-dependent individuals (Petry
et al., 1998). Lastly, substance-dependant individuals display a steeper weakening of
consequence effects due to delay (temporal discounting function) than non-substancedependent individuals (Petry et al., 1998). Ernst and Paulus (2005) posit that increased
activation of the prefrontal cortex in substance-dependent subjects in response to cues
that elicit craving responses could reflect an increased valuation of the drug-related
stimuli relative to non-substance-dependent individuals. This would therefore affect the
process stage of the decision-making process.
Decision-making deficits have been documented in other populations, such as
individuals with prefrontal cortex damage (Bechara, Tranel, & Damasio, 2000). These
individuals have difficulty controlling their impulses which leads to negative
consequences in everyday life. Young adults also appear to have deficits in decisionmaking which lead to problems in their daily lives (Steinberg, 2008). Their difficulty
appears to be related to increased risk-taking and lack of regard for future consequences
(Steinberg, 2004). Studies providing behavioral data on decision-making have been done
to support theoretical accounts such as Ernst and Paulus’ (2005). A widely used
behavioral task to measure decision-making is the Iowa Gambling Task.

Iowa Gambling Task Development and Research
Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, and Anderson (1994) developed a simulated
gambling task (IGT) to examine sensitivity to reward and punishment contingencies in
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patients with prefrontal cortex damage. In this task, participants make selections from
four decks of cards with variable monetary reward and punishment. Some studies using
the IGT use real money while others use hypothetical money. Participants are instructed
to maximize their winnings but are not given any information about the
reward/punishment schedule associated with each deck. Because they are not given any
information about the reinforcement schedule, the participants must sample cards from
each of the decks and make associations between the decks and their particular rewards
and punishments in order to maximize their winnings. Those who perform well on the
IGT make proportionally more advantageous selections which indicates superior
decision-making. Research from Bechara and colleagues has shown that patients with
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) damage perform worse on the IGT than
comparison subjects (Bechara et al., 1994; Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 1997;
Bechara, Tranel, & Damasio, 2000b; Bechara, Tranel, Damasio, & Damasio, 1996). The
patients with vmPFC damage continue to make disadvantageous choices even after many
trials, while comparison subjects learn to avoid the disadvantageous decks over time.
This decision-making deficit has been seen in other populations, including substancedependent subjects and adolescents, who perform similarly to patients with vmPFC
damage (for a review, see Bechara & Damasio, 2002a; Anderson, 2006). Researchers
hypothesize that the decision-making deficits seen in substance-dependent individuals
and adolescents on the IGT may reflect a dysfunction or underdevelopment of the
prefrontal cortex (Bechara & Damasio, 2002a; Grant, Contoreggi, & London, 2000;
Anderson, 2006). Unfortunately the traditional method used for analyzing data from the
IGT (analyzing advantageous choices over time) does not allow one to identify specific
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psychological processes involved. This led to the creation of the Expectancy-Valence
Learning Model discussed below.

Cognitive Modeling Research
The creators of the IGT state that the task “simulates real-life decisions in the way
it factors reward, punishment, and uncertainty of outcomes” (Bechara & Damasio, 2002,
p. 1675), implying that the skills required to perform well on the IGT are similar to those
necessary for effective real-life decision making. However, because the IGT was
designed to investigate the complex interaction of cognitive and motivational processes,
it is hard to discern what specific psychological factors are responsible for the decisionmaking deficits seen on this task (Busemeyer & Stout, 2002). This observation led to the
genesis of the Expectancy-Valence Learning Model designed to isolate the psychological
processes involved in decision-making on the IGT (Busemeyer & Stout, 2002). In the
Expectancy-Valence Learning Model, the gains and losses experienced on each trial are
combined into a single affective reaction termed the “valence”. The decision maker
learns expectancies about the valence produced by each deck by an adaptive learning
mechanism. These expectancies then function as inputs into a probabilistic choice
mechanism that determines the deck selection on each trial. Busemeyer and Stout (2002)
assert that this decision-making process can be broken down into three different
psychological components. These components examine: (1) the influence of rewards
and punishments on the evaluation of options (the attention parameter); (2) the rate at
which contingency payoffs are learned (the learning-rate parameter), and; (3) the

Computational Model of Decision-Making

6

consistency between learning and responding (the response-sensitivity parameter). Each
of these parameters will be discussed in detail below.

The following descriptions of the parameters were obtained from Yechiam, Busemeyer,
Stout, & Bechara (2005).

Attention Parameter (attentions to losses versus wins)
The Attention parameter represents attention to gains and losses. A deck is
selected on each trial and the payoffs (gains and possible losses) are awarded. The model
assumes that the participant differentially weighs the gains and losses experienced. The
valence of payoffs experienced is a weighted average of gains and losses:

v(t) = W · win(t) – (1-W) · loss(t)

where v(t) is the valence on trial t, win(t) is the amount of money won on trial t, loss(t) is
the amount of money lost on trial t, and W is a parameter that indicates the weight given
to gains versus losses. W (the attention parameter) ranges from 0 to 1. Large values of W
denote increasing attention to gains while small values denote attention to losses.

Learning-Rate Parameter (updating expectations)
The Learning-Rate parameter represents attention to most recent outcomes versus
past outcomes. It is assumed that participants form expectancies about the anticipated
consequences of choosing a card from each deck. The expectancy for each deck is
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updated as a function of both its previous value (which represents past experience) and
the newly experienced payoffs on the current trial:

Ej(t) = Ej(t-1) + Φ ·[v(t) –Ej(t-1)]

where Ej(t) is the expectancy for deck j on trial t, Φ is the learning-rate parameter, and
[v(t) –Ej(t-1)] is an adjustment resulting from the prediction error (Busemeyer & Myung,
1992). Φ (the learning-rate parameter) ranges from 0 to 1 and controls the amount of
adjustment from the prediction error. According to this model, “learning-rate” is defined
as the rate at which contingency payoffs are learned. Large values of Φ cause rapid
adjustments and denote strong recency effects and rapid discounting of past outcomes.
Small values denote less discounting of past outcomes.

The Response-Sensitivity Parameter (choice consistency)
The Response-Sensitivity parameter represents the degree to which the participant
applies the expectancies produced by the decks when selecting cards. It is assumed that
consistency increases with experience. The probability of choosing a deck is determined
by comparing the expectancy for that deck with the expectancies for the other decks:

Pr[Gj(t+1)] = e θ(t)·Ej(t)
∑ e θ(t)·Ek(t)
k

where Pr[Gj(t)] is the probability that the individual will select deck j on trial t. θ(t)
indicates the consistency between choices and the expectancies and is assumed to
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increase with experience. A power function for the sensitivity change over trials is used
to calculate the probability that the individual will select a particular deck:

θ(t) = (t/10)c

where c is the response-sensitivity parameter. c ranges from –5 to 5. As c increases in
magnitude, the choices become more dependent on the expectancies (so the deck with
maximum expectancy is chosen). As c decreases in magnitude, choices become more
random, inconsistent, and independent of the expectancies over time.

To summarize, the Expectancy-Valence Learning Model has three parameters: (1)
attention (W), defined as attention given to losses as opposed to gains, (2) learning-rate
(Φ), defined as attention given to most recent outcomes as opposed to past outcomes,
and; (3) response sensitivity (c), defined as choice consistency.

The following is a description of the procedures used by Busemeyer and
colleagues (Busemeyer & Stout, 2002; Yechiam et al., 2005) to analyze the ExpectancyValence model. Similar procedures will be used for data analysis in the current study
(see Data Analysis section).
Baseline Model
A baseline model is used as a standard for comparison against the ExpectancyValence Learning Model. This model is a statistical model rather than a cognitive model,
but like the Expectancy-Valence Learning Model, has three parameters that are estimated
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from the individual participants’ data. However, unlike the cognitive model, the baseline
model assumes that the choices are independently and identically distributed across trials.
Busemeyer and Stout (2002) assert that this model is a strong competitor and that the
Expectancy-Valence Learning Model “can perform better than this baseline model only if
it succeeds in explaining how the choices depend on the sequence of trial-by-trial
feedback” (p. 257).

Model Comparison Analyses
Maximum Likelihood Estimation
Parameters from the Expectancy-Valence Learning Model and baseline model are
estimated separately for each participant using maximum likelihood methods. The
parameters are optimized in order to maximize the likelihood of the observed sequence of
100 choices produced by each participant (Yechiam et al., 2005). For the ExpectancyValence Learning Model, Busemeyer and Stout (2002) used the Nelder-Meade simplex
algorithm (MathWorks Inc., 2000) as a nonlinear parameter search program to maximize
the parameters. For the baseline model, the sample proportion of card choices from each
deck for each participant is equal to the maximum likelihood estimates (Busemeyer et al.,
2002).
Model Comparisons Using the G2 Criterion
After the parameters that maximize the likelihood for each person for each model
are determined, these parameters are used to compare the two models. Busemeyer and
Stout (2002) use the G2 statistic as a descriptive index of model performance. G2 is a
model-fit statistic with a similar distribution to
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the chi-square and uses a chi-square table for significance testing (Yechiam et al., 2005).
Positive G2 values indicate that the Expectancy-Valence Learning model performs better
than the baseline model. The G2 statistic is determined by calculating the difference in
log likelihoods:

G2 = 2(LExpectancy-Valence Learning model – Lbaseline model)

Analysis of Parameter Estimates
In addition to analyzing the fit of the Expectancy-Valence Learning Model, it is
necessary to analyze and interpret the individual model parameters (attention, learningrate, and response sensitivity). According to the model, differences among groups on the
attention parameter (W) would suggest that the performance deficits on the IGT result
from the motivational system rather than the cognitive system (Busemeyer & Stout,
2002). Differences among groups on the learning-rate parameter (Φ) would suggest that
performance deficits on the IGT result from the cognitive system rather than the
motivational system (Busemeyer & Stout, 2002). Lastly, differences in the sensitivity
parameter (c) would suggest that response mechanisms (impulsiveness, recklessness)
account for the performance deficit rather than either cognitive or motivational systems
(Busemeyer & Stout, 2002).
Means, medians, and standard deviations are calculated for each parameter and
are used to determine whether each parameter differs significantly between groups.
Additionally, confidence interval estimates, T-tests, and/or analyses of variance are
calculated separately for each parameter to more rigorously assess observed differences.
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The authors of the Expectancy Valence Learning model have reported poor
performance on the IGT in numerous sub-populations. Decision-making deficits on the
IGT have been observed in patients diagnosed with Huntington’s disease (Stout,
Rodawalt, & Siemers, 2001), obsessive-compulsive disorder (Cavedini et al., 2002),
Asperger’s syndrome (Johnson, Yechiam, Murphy, Stout, & Busemeyer, 2004, as cited in
Yechiam et al., 2005), and chronic drug abuse (Bechara et al., 2001; Stout, Busemeyer,
Lin, Grant, & Bonson, 2004; Yechiam, et al., 2004, as cited in Yechiam, et al., 2005).
Also, patients with lesions in either the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (Bechara, et al.,
1994; Damasio, 1994; Bechara & Damasio, 2002) or somatosensory and insular cortex
(Bechara, Tranel, & Hindes, 1999) perform poorly on the IGT. While these results are
usually interpreted as indications that all of these disorders share a common decisionmaking deficit, Yechiam and colleagues assert that it is possible that different
psychological processes lead to poor IGT performance (Yechiam, et al., 2005).
In order to investigate the possibility that different decision-making deficits lead
to poor performance on IGT, Yechiam and colleagues (2005) reviewed ten applications
of the Expectancy-Valence Learning Model to IGT data. Their results are reproduced in
Table 1 below. Note that the G2 column shows the percentage of subjects in the sample
and control groups whose combined deviation from the baseline model was greater than
0.
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Table 1.
Percentage of Positive G2 Values, Indicating an Improvement of the Adaptive Learning
Model Over the Baseline Model, and Results of Significance Tests for the Parameters
Sample

Sample n

Control n

G2 > 0
(sample + control)

Parameters significantly
different between groupsa

Asperger’s syndrome

15

14

66%

RSIC lesion

22

12

62%

attention (Wb),
choice consistency (c)
choice consistency (c)

Parkinson’s disease

20

33

75% *

-

Young polydrug abusers

3

37

49%

-

Young alcohol abusers

27

32

67% *

-

VMPC lesion

21

12

76% *

Normal seniors

63

87

61% *

Huntington’s disease

14

33

75% *

learning-rate (Φ),
choice consistency (c)
attention (W),
choice consistency (c)
-

Chronic cannabis users

25

16

24% *

Chronic cocaine abusers

12

14

69% *

learning rate (Φ),
attention (W)
attention (W)

Note. RSC = right somatosensory and insular cortex; VMPC= ventromedial prefrontal cortex
a
A significance level of p < .05 was adopted. bThis parameter became significant after 150 trials.
*p < .05 in a binomial test.

All of the populations above except young polydrug abusers and young alcohol
abusers showed differences from their control groups. It is possible that there were no
differences found in the young polydrug and young alcohol abusers groups due to the low
number of subjects. Also, the model fit as measured by the G2 statistic was low,
especially for the young polydrug abusers. Control groups for all of the populations were
“matched on extraneous variables such as age, gender, and education” (Yechiam, et al.,
2005, p. 975). It should be noted that the data for the control groups were obtained by
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Yechiam and colleagues for comparison to the sample groups. Table 2 summarizes the
significant differences found.

Table 2.
Significant Parameter Differences Between Neuropsychological Disorder Groups
and Their Respective Controls
Sample
Significant parameter differences
More (+) or Less
Greater (+) or Lesser More (+) or Less (-)
(-) Attention to
(-) Recency Effects ( Choice Consistency
Gains Over
Φ)
(c)
Losses (W)
Asperger’s syndrome
0
RSIC lesion
0
Parkinson’s Disease
0
0
Young polydrug abusers
0
0
0
Young alcohol abusers
0
0
0
VMPC lesion
0
+
Normal seniors
+
0
+
Huntington’s disease
0
0
0
Chronic cannabis users
+
+
0
Chronic cocaine abusers
+
0
0
Note: 0 indicates no significant difference between neuropsychological disorder group and control.

The results show that different psychological components are associated with
poor performance on the IGT in different neuropsychological disorders (Yechiam,
Busemeyer, Stout, & Bechara, 2005). These findings suggest that groups who perform
poorly on the IGT may not do so for the same reasons. Thus, the Expectancy-Valence
Learning Model is useful for isolating the particular decision-making deficits seen on this
complex task.

Previous Research in the Environmental Neuropsychology Laboratory
In previous research completed in the Environmental Neuropsychology
Laboratory, young adults at-risk for substance dependence and normal control peers were
given the IGT as part of a larger study of decision-making in a college population
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(Anderson, Castelda, MacKillop, Mattson, & Donovick, 2006). The at-risk group was
operationally defined as having a score of 8 or above on the Alcohol Use Disorders
Identification Test (AUDIT), a self-report measure that is commonly used in studies
because of its ease of use and well-documented reliability and validity (Allen, Litten,
Fertiz, & Babor, 1997; Fleming, Barry, & MacDonald, 1991; Hays, Merz, & Nicholas,
1995; Reinert & Allen, 2002). The researchers in the Environmental Neuropsychology
Laboratory found that the young adults in both groups performed poorly on the IGT
regardless of drinking behavior. Indeed, the participants in the Anderson et al. (2006)
study were significantly below the previously reported net score cutoff for impaired
decision-making (net score=10) established by Bechara and Damasio (2002a; 2002b). In
fact, the performance of young adults on the IGT was similar to that of brain-damaged
and substance dependent populations. These findings led to further research in the
laboratory utilizing the IGT in a young adult population (17 to 20 year-old; Anderson,
2006). Anderson (2006) argued that neurodevelopmental changes occurring in young
adulthood could account for poor IGT performance in young adults in her study. Her
study examined the relationship between skin conductance, motivation, and decisionmaking in a young adult college population. While the group that was offered real
money for their performance on the IGT (“motivation group”) achieved relatively higher
overall net scores than the groups that were not offered real money, the motivation group
did not perform well on the task in an absolute sense, as they lost money overall.
Additionally, even when combining real money and competition with other participants
(“competition group”), the young adults in Anderson’s (2006) study did not perform as
well as healthy adults in previously published literature (Bechara & Damasio, 2002a).
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These studies suggest that, in general, the young adult college population
performs more poorly on the IGT than older adult populations. This performance deficit
is exhibited regardless of risk-status for alcohol abuse or motivating factors. However, it
is difficult to identify the specific cognitive, motivational, and response processes responsible
for these observed behavioral deficits using traditional IGT analyses. The ValenceExpectancy Learning Model provides a theoretical basis for decomposing this complex task
into separate processes. Thus, the current study used the Valence-Expectancy Learning

Model to dissect young adult performance on the IGT in order to better understand the
observed decision-making deficits.

Proposed Study
The purpose of the present study was to further examine IGT performance in a
young adult college population. As done in previous studies in the Environmental
Neuropsychology Laboratory, both monetary motivation and alcohol behavior were
studied. However, because previous research in the Environmental Neuropsychology
Laboratory showed that young adults perform poorly on the IGT regardless of risk-status
for alcohol abuse or motivating factors, the Valence-Expectancy Learning Model was
utilized to further analyze the decision-making of these individuals. Specifically, the
Valence-Expectancy Learning Model was applied to identify differences in underlying
psychological processes that might account for the performance of these individuals on
the IGT.
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The hypotheses of the current study were as follows:

Behavioral Hypotheses
1. There would be no differences between young adults who are not at-risk for alcohol
dependence and those who are at-risk.
2. Young adults who are able to earn real money on the IGT would perform better than
young adults who are not offered real money for their performance.
3. Males would perform better than females on the IGT, regardless of condition.

Cognitive Model Hypotheses

4. Young adults who are at-risk for alcohol dependence would differ from young adults
who are not at-risk on the attention parameter. At-risk young adults would pay more
attention to wins than losses than those who are not at-risk. They would not differ on
memory or consistency parameters.
5. Young adults who have the opportunity to earn real money on the IGT would differ on
the consistency parameter, making more choices from the deck with the maximum
expectancy. They would not differ on the attention or memory parameters.
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Method

Participants
The current study used data collected in the Environmental Neuropsychology
Laboratory between April and November of 2005. In that study, 174 undergraduates
enrolled at Binghamton University were recruited as participants. They were selected
based on their alcohol-related behaviors as defined by their scores on the Alcohol Use
Disorders Test (AUDIT) given during mass testing. They were assigned to either the
Motivation (possible monetary compensation) or Control (no monetary compensation)
group based on AUDIT score (At-Risk ≥8) and gender so that each group was
approximately 50% male and 50% at-risk for alcohol abuse. There were 87 participants
in each group (Motivation or Control). The participants received course credit for
participation and those in the Motivation condition had the opportunity to earn monetary
compensation. The mean age of the sample was 18.8 (SD = 0.94) years and the ethnicity
of the participants was: 60% Caucasian, 27% Asian, 4% Hispanic/Latino, 8%
Black/African American, 1% Pacific Islander, and 1% Other.

Materials
Iowa Gambling Task (IGT; A’B’C’D’ version; Bechara, Tranel, & Damasio,
2000b): Overall performance on the IGT was measured by a monetary amount displayed
on the computer screen indicating total amount won or lost, but this amount did not
translate into actual monetary gain. Therefore, the monetary gains and losses described
below represent hypothetical money, except where noted. In the version used, the
participant used a mouse to select one of four cards displayed on a computer screen. The
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decks were labeled: A, B, C, and D. Table 3 summarizes the contingencies associated
with each of the four decks.

Table 3.
Differences between Decks in the IGT

Reward for each selection
Magnitude of loss/10 cards
Frequency of loss/10 cards
Net gain or loss/10 cards
Classification

Disadvantageous Decks
A
B
$100
$100
$1,250
5
$-250
Disadvantageous,
frequent
punishment

$1,250
1
$-250
Disadvantageous,
infrequent
punishment

Advantageous Decks
C
D
$50
$50
$250
5
$250
Advantageous,
frequent
punishment

$250
1
$250
Advantageous,
infrequent
punishment

The participant earned a reward every time a card was drawn ($100 for Decks A
and B; $50 for Decks C and D). Sometimes, a card also had a penalty (A and B had a
total penalty of $1,250 for every ten cards; C and D had a total penalty of $250 for every
ten cards). Therefore, choosing cards from the two disadvantageous decks (A and B)
resulted in an overall net “loss” while choosing from the two advantageous decks (C and
D) resulted in an overall net “gain”. Although on this version of the task it was possible
to exhaust the decks, this did not happen in the current study.
As can be seen in Table 3, the distribution of the losses over trials distinguished
Deck A from B and Deck C from D. Decks A and C had five smaller losses for every
ten cards while decks B and D had one larger loss for every ten cards. Choosing from the
advantageous decks resulted in lower immediate reward and lower overall punishment
than choosing from the disadvantageous decks. In order to win money in the game the
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participant needed to make more choices from the advantageous decks than from the
disadvantageous decks.
Every time the participant selected a card the computer played a sound signifying
a win or loss and displayed a happy or sad face. In addition, a message was displayed
indicating the amount of money won or lost. A green bar on the top of the screen
indicated a $2000 credit to start the game. The red bar underneath it displayed how much
hypothetical money the participant borrowed to play the game, and how much money
they would theoretically have to pay back before calculating the total amount won or lost.

Alcohol Use Disorders Identification Test (AUDIT; Babor, Higgins-Biddle,
Saunders, & Monteiro, 2001): The AUDIT is a ten-item self-report screening measure
that consists of questions regarding recent alcohol use, alcohol dependence symptoms,
and alcohol-related problems (see Appendix A). Each response has a score ranging from
0 to 4, providing a total score between 0 and 40. The reliability and validity of the
AUDIT have been established in numerous studies (Allen, Litten, Fertiz, & Babor, 1997;
Fleming, Barry, & MacDonald, 1991; Hays, Merz, & Nicholas, 1995; Reinert & Allen,
2002). Hazardous and harmful alcohol use and possible alcohol dependence is indicated
by a score of 8 or above on the AUDIT (Babor, Higgins-Biddle, Saunders, & Monteiro,
2001). This score reflects a higher risk of alcohol-related problems. The AUDIT has
been used in many previous studies at Binghamton University (see Anderson, 2006;
Anderson, et al., submitted; Mackillop, et al., 2007).

Computational Model of Decision-Making

20

Procedure- 2005 Study
The current study analyzed data collected between April and November of 2005.
The procedures employed in the 2005 data collection were in keeping with the previous
protocol used in the Environmental Neuropsychology Laboratory.
The participants in this study were selected based on their scores on the Alcohol
Use Disorders Test (AUDIT) given during mass testing. All participants were tested
individually. A score of 8 or above was used to define the At-Risk for alcohol
dependence group (At-Risk). The participants were assigned to either the Motivation or
Control group based on: (1) AUDIT score (At-Risk ≥8) obtained during mass testing,
and; (2) gender. This method was applied so that each group would be approximately
50% male and 50% at-risk for alcohol abuse. Because some of the questions on the
AUDIT assess recent alcohol use, the questionnaire was re-administered at the time of
participation in the study to assure that the participants’ group status (At-Risk or Not Atrisk) had not changed since mass testing. The participant was classified as At-Risk or
Not At-Risk based on the AUDIT score obtained at the time of participation in cases
where the AUDIT score had indeed changed. A total of 15 AUDIT scores changed
between mass testing and time of participation. Of these, 14 (10 females, 4 males) scores
changed from At-Risk to Not At-Risk while only 1 (male) score changed from Not AtRisk to At-Risk. Consequently, approximately 40% of the females and 47% of the males
were ultimately classified as At-Risk.
The participants were asked to sit in front of the IGT computer after reading and
signing the consent form. In order to collect data for a co-occurring study, electrodes
were affixed to the participant’s non-dominant hand before they began playing the task as
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a measure of skin conductance response (note: this portion of the data set was not
analyzed in the current study as it represents a different domain of information than that
of interest for the current research question). The participants were then read the
standard instructions for the IGT (Appendix B). On average, the participants spent 20
minutes playing the game. After the IGT, the participants completed the AUDIT. Total
administration time was approximately 25 minutes.

Motivation Condition
In the Motivation condition, participants were read the standard instructions for
the IGT but were informed that they could win real money based on their performance.
They were able to win the money shown on the screen divided by 1,000. For example, if
they won 1,000 dollars in the game, they would be given $1 of real money. This
monetary incentive was also used in Anderson’s (2006) dissertation and is in keeping
with a previously published study examining the effect of monetary incentives on
performance on the IGT (Anderson, 2006; Bowman & Turnbull, 2003). The participants
were also informed that they would not have to pay back the experimenter if they lost
money in the game. Additionally, if they won over $1,500 in the game ($1.50 of real
money), they would receive a $5 bonus. This bonus incentive was implemented to match
the procedure used in the Anderson (2006) study. The participants were asked to
paraphrase the instructions to indicate that they understood that they would win the
amount of money displayed on the computer screen divided by 1,000 (see Appendix C).
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Control Condition
The participants in the control condition were administered the IGT in the
standard administration procedure. There was no monetary compensation in this
condition (see Appendix B).

Data Collection- 2005 Study
Consent
Each participant signed a consent form prior to participating indicating that they
voluntarily agreed to be in the study. This form additionally stated that they would not be
penalized if they chose not to participate in the study (see Appendix D).
Confidentiality
Each participant folder contains only a file number. All identifying information
was kept in a locked cabinet separate from the participant files.
Investigators
Three undergraduate research assistants assisted in data collection and data entry.
As required by the HSRRB at Binghamton University, each of the research assistants as
well as the principal investigator completed the online course in research ethics prior to
contact with participants or data.

Procedure- Current Study
The current study analyzed the data collected in the 2005 study. This data set has
not been previously analyzed. The principal investigator used both traditional behavioral
data analyses and the Expectancy-Valence Learning Model to examine performance on
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the IGT (see Introduction and Results sections). To the principal investigator’s
knowledge, no published studies have investigated young adult performance on the IGT
using the Expectancy-Valence Learning Model. The current study identified
psychological components associated with poor performance on the IGT in this young
adult population of college students.
Stallen (2006) created a Microsoft Excel® application of the Expectancy-Valence
Learning model to efficiently analyze IGT results. The Stallen program uses the
formulas described by Busemeyer and Stout (2002) in Excel® format to estimate the
parameters of the model as well as make model comparisons. Stallen’s (2006) Microsoft
Excel® application of the Expectancy-Valence Learning Model was used to analyze the
cognitive modeling data in the current study.
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Results
Participant Characteristics
One hundred seventy four undergraduate students participated in this study. The
participants were assigned to either the Motivation or Control group based on: (1)
AUDIT score (At-Risk ≥8) obtained during mass testing, and; (2) gender. However, as
described in the methods section, a second AUDIT was administered at the time of
participation to assure that the participants’ group status (At-Risk or not At-risk) had not
changed. When there were in fact discrepancies in the AUDIT scores, the score obtained
at the time of participation was used for classification purposes. Thus, approximately
40% of the females and 47% of the males were ultimately classified as At-Risk.
The Control and Motivation groups were each 48% male. The mean age of the
sample was 18.8 (SD = 0.94) years and the ethnicity of the participants was: 60%
Caucasian, 27% Asian, 8% Black/African American, 4% Hispanic/Latino, 1% Pacific
Islander, and 1% Other.
Table 4 indicates that the two groups tested in this study (Control and Motivation)
were similar in terms of gender, age, and age range. In addition, there were no education
or ethnicity differences between the two groups.
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Table 4.
Demographic data of subjects participating in the IGT (N=174)
Control (No Monetary Compensation)

Motivation (Monetary Compensation)

AUDIT < 8 *

AUDIT ≥ 8 *

AUDIT < 8 *

AUDIT ≥ 8 *

54

33

48

39

Gender

26 ♂, 28 ♀

16 ♂, 17 ♀

20 ♂, 28 ♀

22 ♂, 17 ♀

Age (years; mean ± SD)

18.72 ± 0.81

19.00 ± 1.00

18.69 ± 0.93

18.95 ± 1.05

Total # of Subjects

18-21
18-21
18-21
Age range (years)
* Note: AUDIT <8 = Not At-Risk for alcohol abuse; AUDIT ≥ 8 = At-Risk for alcohol abuse

18-22

As in previous IGT studies (Bechara & Damasio, 2002a; Bechara, Dolan, &
Hindes, 2002b; Anderson, 2006), the 100 card selections were subdivided into blocks of
20 cards each. In each block, the number of selections from decks A and B
(disadvantageous) were subtracted from the number of selections from decks C and D
(advantageous) producing the net score for that block ((C + D) – (A + B)). Net scores
above 0 indicate that participants were selecting advantageously while net scores below
zero indicate that the participants were selecting disadvantageously. Figure 1 shows the
net scores for males and females in the Control and Motivation conditions.
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Figure 1. Control (n=87) and Motivation (n=87) condition net score over time blocks.
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Although the current investigator had no a priori hypotheses about learning over time, the
groups were compared for descriptive purposes. All groups chose more advantageously
over time, but there were no significant differences among groups in the rate at which
they learned. Anderson, Robeson, and Donovick (2005) found that young college
students perform better on the IGT when given 150 trials compared to 100 trials in
standard conditions. These findings suggest that young adults appear to make more
advantageous decisions on the IGT when they are given more trials. Therefore, it is
possible that learning rate differences would emerge in the current study if subjects were
given more trials.
Behavioral Data Analyses
Data were analyzed with the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences for
Windows, Version 15.0 (SPSS Inc., Chicago, IL). Data were examined for normality to
ensure that the assumptions of parametric statistics were met before analyses were
conducted.
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A 2 (group) x 2 (AUDIT) x 2 (gender) univariate analysis of variance (ANOVA)
was conducted to address the three behavioral hypotheses. An alpha level of .05 was
used to determine whether findings were significant.
Recall that net score was calculated by subtracting disadvantageous deck
selections from advantageous deck selections (net score= (C + D) – (A + B)). There were
no net score differences among group, audit, or gender. Over half of the participants (101
participants; 58%) performed in the impaired range; that is, below the total net cutoff
established in previous studies for impaired decision-making (net score= 10; Bechara &
Damasio, 2002a; Bechara, Dolan, & Hindes, 2002b). Table 5 shows the mean net score
and standard deviation for each group. It is probable that the large net score standard
deviation contributed to the null findings. Figure 2 shows the mean for each
experimental group with the error bars representing one standard deviation above and
below the mean.

Table 5.
Mean net score of participants (N=174)

AUDIT < 8 *

AUDIT ≥ 8 *

Male

4.90 (± 35.15)
n= 28

9.18 (± 25.37)
n= 28

Female

9.93 (± 30.64)
n= 28

4.06 (± 34.29)
n= 28

Male

8.15 (± 20.05)
n= 26

16.38 (± 21.49)
n= 16

Motivation (n= 87)

Control (n= 87)

-1.14 (± 29.79)
-7.18 (± 28.13)
n= 28
n= 17
* Note: AUDIT <8 = Not At-Risk for alcohol abuse; AUDIT ≥ 8 = At-Risk for alcohol abuse
Female
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Figure 2. Average net score of control and motivation conditions.
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These results support the current study’s hypothesis that there would be no
differences between young adults who are not at-risk for alcohol dependence and those
who are at-risk. However, the other two behavioral data hypotheses in this study
(2:Young adults who were able to earn real money on the IGT would perform better than
young adults who were not offered real money for their performance; and 3: Males would
perform better than females on the IGT, regardless of condition) were not supported.
These results are unexpected given that previous studies conducted in the Environmental
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Neuropsychology Laboratory using similar (in terms of age, education, ethnicity, and
gender) participants did indeed find gender and monetary effects (Anderson, 2006;
Anderson et al., 2006).

Cognitive Modeling Analyses
Comparisons with Baseline Model
After the optimum parameter estimates were found, the G2 statistic was computed
using the following equation:

G2 = 2(LExpectancy-Valence Learning model – Lbaseline model)

A positive G2 statistic indicated that the Expectancy-Valence Learning model
outperformed the baseline model. The Expectancy-Valence Learning Model produced a
positive G2 for 43% (76) of the participants. The average G2 improvement of the
Expectancy-Valence Learning Model over the baseline model was 15.24. The negative
G2 for the remaining 57% of the participants indicates that the Expectancy-Valence
Learning Model did not succeed in explaining how the participants’ choices were
dependent on trial-by-trial feedback. Thus, it was not appropriate to further analyze the
data from these participants. Therefore, the remaining cognitive modeling analyses were
conducted utilizing the data from the 76 participants with a positive G2. This subset of
participants was similar to the original 174 participants in terms of age, education,
ethnicity, gender, group, and AUDIT risk status.
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Interestingly, while there were no net score differences found among the groups
(see Behavioral Data Analyses section), when net scores were compared for those with
positive versus negative G2, significant net score differences were found. Participants
with a positive G2 had higher net scores than participants with a negative G2 [t(172)=
2.179, p=.031]. Indeed, participants with positive G2 had a mean net score of 10.87 while
those with a negative G2 had a mean net score of 1.43. Using Bechara and Damasio’s
(2002a; 2002b) net score cutoff of 10 for impaired decision-making, these results suggest
that participants with a negative G2 displayed impaired decision-making on the Iowa
Gambling Task while participants with a positive G2 did not. A 2 (group) x 2 (AUDIT) x
2 (gender) univariate ANOVA was conducted on this subset of subjects with a positive
G2 but no significant differences emerged.

Analysis of Parameter Estimates
The three parameters of the Expectancy-Valence Learning Model are: attention
(W), attention given to losses as opposed to gains; learning-rate (Φ), attention given to
most recent outcomes as opposed to past outcomes, and; response sensitivity (c),
sensitivity of the choice mechanisms to the expectancies.
According to the model, differences among groups in the attention parameter
would indicate deficits on the Iowa Gambling Task result from the attentional system,
whereas differences among groups in the learning rate parameter would indicate
performance deficits result from the cognitive system. Differences among groups on the
response sensitivity parameter would indicate that recklessness and/or impulsivity are
responsible rather than attentional or cognitive mechanisms (Busemeyer & Stout, 2002).

Computational Model of Decision-Making

31

Two 2 (group) x 2 (AUDIT) x 2 (gender) univariate analyses of variance
(ANOVA) were conducted to address each of the two cognitive modeling hypotheses.
An alpha level of .05 was used to determine whether findings were significant. The
means, medians, and standard deviations for the parameter estimates are shown below
(Table 4).

Table 6.
Expectancy-Valence Learning Model Parameter Estimates

Group
Control
(n= 37;
No Money)
Motivation
(n=39;
Money)

Attention (W)
(0 to 1)
M
Mdn
SD
0.32 0.09
0.40

Learning Rate (Φ)
(0 to 1)
M
Mdn SD
0.48 0.41 0.32

0.21

0.32

0.38

0.34

0.36

0.25

Response Sensitivity (c)
(-5 to +5)
M
Mdn
SD
1.05
0.99
2.17

1.96

1.42

2.14

A 2 (group) x 2 (AUDIT) x 2 (gender) univariate ANOVA was conducted to
examine the differences between the groups on the attention (W) parameter. The
attention (W) parameter was significantly higher for the Control group than the
Motivation group [F1, 68= 7.216, p= .009]. This indicates that the Motivation group paid
more attention to losses than the Control group. However, there were no attention (W)
parameter differences found between males and females [F1, 68= 1.207, p= .276] or AtRisk and Not At-Risk [F1, 68= 0.086, p= .771] groups. Therefore, the hypothesis that
young adults who were at-risk for alcohol dependence would differ on the motivation
parameter, paying more attention to wins than losses than those who were not at-risk, was
not supported.
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A 2 (group) x 2 (AUDIT) x 2 (gender) univariate ANOVA was conducted to
examine the differences between the groups on the response sensitivity (c) parameter.
The difference between the Control and Motivation groups approached significance [F1,
68=

3.378, p= .069], indicating that the members of Motivation group made choices that

were somewhat more sensitive to their expectancies about the decks. There were no
response sensitivity (c) parameter differences found between males and females [F1, 68=
0.467, p= .497] or At-Risk and Not At-Risk [F1, 68= 0.028, p= .869] groups. The
hypothesis that young adults who had the opportunity to earn real money on the IGT
would differ on the consistency parameter, making more choices from the deck with the
maximum expectancy was marginally supported.
Although there were no a priori hypotheses regarding the learning rate (Φ)
parameter, it was analyzed for descriptive purposes. A 2 (group) x 2 (AUDIT) x 2
(gender) univariate ANOVA was conducted. There were no learning rate (Φ) parameter
differences between Motivation and Control [F1, 68= 0.785, p= .379], males and females
[F1, 68= 0.330, p= .567], or At-Risk and Not At-Risk [F1, 68= 1.927, p= .170] groups.
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Discussion
The present study used the Iowa Gambling Task (Bechara et al.,2000) to
investigate decision making in young adults. Poor performance on the IGT has been
associated with impaired decision making as a result of ventromedial prefrontal cortex
damage (Bechara et al., 1994; Damasio, 1998), substance abuse (Petry, 2001; Bechara &
Damasio, 2002a), and immaturity of the frontal lobes (Hooper et al., 2004). Traditional
IGT analyses (examining net scores over blocks of time) do not allow the researcher to
attribute poor performance to specific steps in the decision making process. Busemeyer
and Stout’s (2002) Expectancy-Valence Learning Model provides a theoretical basis for
decomposing decision making on the IGT into distinct psychological processes. Thus,
we are better able to understand the mechanisms of complex decision making. The
current study was the first to use the Expectancy-Valence Learning Model to examine
decision making on the IGT in a large sample of young adults. The participants in this
study represent a group of students from a competitive public university. As noted by
Anderson (2006), however, the participants’ performance on the IGT suggests that
knowledge did not necessarily translate into advantageous decision-making strategies.
Nevertheless, it would be wise to recognize this potential limitation when interpreting the
results of this study.
In this study, differences between groups were not found using traditional
behavioral analyses. However, when the Expectancy-Valence Learning model was
applied to the data, interesting group differences emerged.

Computational Model of Decision-Making

34

Results of Behavioral Data Analyses
Based on previous findings in the Environmental Neuropsychology Laboratory, it
was hypothesized that there would be no IGT performance differences between young
adults who are not at risk for alcohol dependence and those who are at-risk. The results
of the current study support this hypothesis. Many consider the alcohol-related behaviors
measured on the AUDIT to indicate recklessness, impulsivity, and poor decision-making.
The findings of the current study suggest that real-life risky alcohol use does not
necessarily translate into poor decision-making on the IGT. This is in keeping with
Anderson’s (2006) proposition that either: (1) performance on the IGT may not depend
on real-world behaviors such as gambling or alcohol use; or (2) the IGT measures a
different construct than decision-making, gambling, and impulsivity in the younger
population.
The hypothesis that young adults who were able to earn real money on the IGT
would perform better than young adults who were not offered real money for their
performance was not supported in this study. This result are unexpected given that
previous studies conducted in the Environmental Neuropsychology Laboratory using
similar (in terms of age, education, ethnicity, and gender) participants did indeed find
gender and monetary effects (Anderson, 2006; Anderson et al., submitted). It is possible
that the total amount of money offered was not enough to influence the performance of
the young adults in this study. Yet, interesting cognitive modeling differences between
the Control and Motivation groups emerged and will be discussed below (see Cognitive
Modeling Analyses).
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The hypothesis that males would perform better than females on the IGT,
regardless of condition, was not supported. Recent studies have found that females
perform significantly worse on the IGT than males (Hooper et al., 2004; Overman et al.,
2004). Hooper (2004) suggested that females are more punishment aversive; that is, their
IGT performance reflects a desire to avoid frequent punishment. However, this puts
these females in a position to lose more money on the task because they choose from the
deck with the most infrequent but highest magnitude of punishment. In Anderson’s
(2006) study, females in the Control group performed similarly to the punishment
aversive females described by Hooper (2004). However, the females in the Attention,
Motivation, and Competition groups in Anderson’s (2006) study performed as well as or
better than the males. According to Anderson (2006), this suggests that females may
derive their motivation from more external cues than internal cues. Therefore, there are
many potentially confounding cognitive and personality variables which could explain
performance differences between men and women on the IGT.
Results of Cognitive Model Analyses
The Expectancy-Valence Learning Model produced a positive G2 for 43% (76) of
the participants in this study. The average G2 improvement of the Expectancy-Valence
Learning Model over the baseline model was 15.24. The negative G2 for the remaining
57% of the participants indicates that the Expectancy-Valence Learning Model did not
succeed in explaining how the participants’ choices were dependent on trial-by-trial
feedback. Instead, the baseline model, which assumes that the participants’ choices are
independently and identically distributed across trials, was a better fit for 57% of the
participants. If you interpret the baseline model to represent random responding or lack
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of effort on the IGT, this suggests that slightly over half of the participants were not
invested in the task. This indirectly speaks to a potential problem regarding young adult
performance on the IGT; that is, that the participants don’t care whether they win or lose.
Indeed, the mean net score for participants with a positive G2 was significantly higher
than the mean net score for participants with a negative G2. In fact, the mean net score
for participants with a negative G2 (mean net score= 1.43) was below the net score cutoff
for impaired decision-making (Bechara & Damasio, 2002a; 2002b) while the mean net
score for participants with a positive G2 (mean net score= 10.87) was above the cutoff.
The range of net scores was the same for both the positive and negative G2 groups, so
some people in each group performed very well while others performed very poorly.
This indicates that the Expectancy Valence Learning model’s fit is not dependent on
whether a participant wins or loses on the IGT. It is possible that the poor IGT
performance exhibited by young adults is due in large part to lack of investment in the
task. Whether the lack of investment displayed by these young adults is due to
underdevelopment of the prefrontal cortex, purposeful lack of attention to the task (they
simply didn’t care if they performed well), and/or other factors is impossible to discern in
the current study.
Because the cognitive model did not fit for 57% of the participants, the analysis
of parameter estimates was done on the remaining 74 participants, who were similar to
the original 174 participants in terms of age, education, ethnicity, gender, group, and
AUDIT risk status.
Recall that large values on the attention parameter (W) denote increasing attention
to gains while small values denote increasing attention to losses. The current study found
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that the attention parameter was significantly lower for the Motivation group than for the
Control group, indicating that the Motivation group paid more attention to losses than the
Control group. Participants who were able to earn real money on the IGT were more
attentive to the losses they experienced but this did not translate into higher overall net
scores for the Motivation group.
The hypothesis that young adults who have the opportunity to earn real money on
the IGT would differ on the response sensitivity/consistency parameter, making more
choices from the deck with the maximum expectancy was marginally supported. The
difference between groups on the response sensitivity/consistency parameter (c)
approached significance, suggesting that the Motivation group made choices that were
somewhat more sensitive to their expectancies about the decks. Again, the Motivation
group did not have a higher mean net score (net score= advantageous choices –
disadvantageous choices) than the Control group, but results from this study suggest that
they paid more attention to the losses they experienced and that their choices were
somewhat more dependent on their expectancies than the Control group.
The hypothesis that young adults who are at-risk for alcohol dependence would
differ on the motivation parameter, paying more attention to wins than losses than those
who are not at-risk was not supported by these results. Findings from this study suggest
that young adults who are at-risk for alcohol dependence do not perform differently on
the IGT than young adults who are not at-risk. This is evident even when using the
Expectancy-Valence Learning model to examine the performance of these individuals.
One possible reason for this is that the IGT measures a different construct than impulsive
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decision-making in the young adult population. It is also possible that performance on
the IGT does not depend on real-world behaviors such as alcohol use.

The purpose of this study was to better understand young adult decision-making.
Young adults have a tendency to make risky decisions and engage in dangerous activities
far more than younger children or older adults. Congruently, young adults exhibit poor
decision-making on the Iowa Gambling Task, which is considered by many to be a
laboratory analogue of real-world decision-making (Bechara et al, 2000; Dunn,
Dalgleish, & Lawrence, 2006). Therefore, a better understanding of young adults’
performance deficits on the IGT could lead to better understanding of their real-world
decision-making.
IGT performance is typically analyzed as choice proportions averaged across
trials, even though the task provides numerous observations (100 trials) for each
participant. The Expectancy-Valence Learning model was designed to analyze the trialby-trial choices and outcomes on the IGT to gain a better understanding of the intricate
cognitive processes that shape an individual’s choice behavior (Yechiam, Kanz, Bechara,
Stout, Busemeyer, et al., 2008). An important advantage of the Expectancy-Valence
Learning model over other types of analyses is that the model provides estimates of
cognitive, motivational, and response processes that are estimated directly from the data.
This is an exciting and new area of study, and additional research aimed at testing the
Expectancy-Valence Learning model in young adult populations is needed.
The use of complex decision-making tasks such as the IGT to mimic real-world
decision-making has the potential to improve our understanding of how young people
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make decisions in their everyday lives. Future studies looking at young adult decisionmaking should include varied ways to measure risk-taking behaviors. As noted by
Steinberg (2008), many of the risky behaviors seen during adolescence are decisions
made in a group setting. Undoubtedly this experience is different than sitting in a
laboratory making decisions in isolation. In the future, studies should be conducted that
take into account group dynamics and their influence on young adult decision-making.
Perhaps we will discover that the evolutionarily-adaptive drive to take risks in social
situations is the most powerful motivator of all.
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APPENDIX A

AUDIT
1. How often do you have a drink containing alcohol?
Never

Monthly
Or less

2-4 times
a month

2-3 times
a week

4 or more
times a week

2. How many drinks containing alcohol do you have on a typical day when you are
drinking?
1 or 2

3 or 4

5 or 6

7 to 9

10 or more

3. How often do you have six or more drinks on one occasion?
Never

Monthly
Or less

2-4 times
a month

2-3 times
a week

Daily or
almost daily

4. How often during the last year have you found that you were not able to stop
drinking once you started?
Never

Monthly
Or less

2-4 times
a month

2-3 times
a week

Daily or
almost daily

5. How often during the last year have you failed to do what is normally expected
from you because of drinking?
Never

Monthly
Or less

2-4 times
a month

2-3 times
a week

Daily or
almost daily

6. How often during the last year have you needed a first drink in the morning to get
yourself going after a heavy session?
Never

Monthly
Or less

2-4 times
a month

2-3 times
a week

Daily or
almost daily

7. How often in the last year have you had a feeling of remorse or guilt after
drinking?
Never

Monthly
Or less

2-4 times
a month

2-3 times
a week

Daily or
almost daily
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8. How often during the last year have you been unable to remember what happened
last night because of your drinking?
Never

Monthly
Or less

2-4 times
a month

2-3 times
a week

Daily or
almost daily

9. Have you or someone else been injured because of your drinking?
No

Yes, but not in the past year

Yes, during the past year

10. Has a relative, friend, doctor, or other health care worker been concerned about
your drinking or suggested you cut down?
No

Yes, but not in the past year

Yes, during the past year
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APPENDIX B
IGT Standard Administration Instructions
“In front of you on the screen there are four decks of cards: A, B, C, D.
I want you to select one card at a time, by clicking on the card, from any deck you
choose.
Each time you select a card, the computer will tell you that you won some money. I
don’t know how much money you will win. You will find out as we go along. Every
time you win, the green bar gets bigger.
Every so often, however, when you click on a card, the computer tells you that you won
some money, but then it says that you lost some money too. I don’t know when you will
lose, or how much you will lose. You will find out as we go along. Every time you lose,
the green bar gets smaller.
You are absolutely free to switch from one deck to the other at any time, and as often as
you wish.
The goal of the game is to win as much money as possible, and if you can’t win, avoid
losing money as much as possible.
You won’t know when the game will end. You must keep on playing until the computer
stops.
I am going to give you this $2000 credit, the green bar, to start the game. The red bar
here is a reminder of how much money you borrowed to play the game, and how much
money you have to pay back before we see how much you won or lost.
It is important to know that just like in a real card game the computer does not change the
order of the cards after the game starts. You may not be able to figure out exactly when
you will lose money, but the game is fair. The computer does not make you lose money
at random, or make you lose money based on the last card you picked. So you must not
try to figure out what the computer is doing. All I can say is that some decks are worse
than others. No matter how much you find yourself losing, you can still win if you stay
away from the worst decks. Please treat the play money in this game as real money, and
any decision on what to do with it should be made as if you were using your own money.
Are there any questions? Ready? Begin.”

Computational Model of Decision-Making

49

APPENDIX C
IGT Motivation Condition Administration Instructions
Italics represent changes from originally published protocol (Bechara et al., 2000)
“In front of you on the screen there are four decks of cards: A, B, C, D.
I want you to select one card at a time, by clicking on the card, from any deck you
choose.
Each time you select a card, the computer will tell you that you won some money. I
don’t know how much money you will win. You will find out as we go along. Every
time you win, the green bar gets bigger.
Every so often, however, when you click on a card, the computer tells you that you won
some money, but then it says that you lost some money too. I don’t know when you will
lose, or how much you will lose. You will find out as we go along. Every time you lose,
the green bar gets smaller.
You are absolutely free to switch from one deck to the other at any time, and as often as
you wish.
The goal of the game is to win as much money as possible, and if you can’t win, avoid
losing money as much as possible.
You won’t know when the game will end. You must keep on playing until the computer
stops.
I am going to give you this $2000 credit, the green bar, to start the game. The red bar
here is a reminder of how much money you borrowed to play the game, and how much
money you have to pay back before we see how much you won or lost.
It is important to know that just like in a real card game the computer does not change the
order of the cards after the game starts. You may not be able to figure out exactly when
you will lose money, but the game is fair. The computer does not make you lose money
at random, or make you lose money based on the last card you picked. So you must not
try to figure out what the computer is doing. All I can say is that some decks are worse
than others. No matter how much you find yourself losing, you can still win if you stay
away from the worst decks.
See on the screen where it says you begin with $2000? Since we cannot afford to give
you $2000 to start, we will divide that amount by 1000 and give you $2.00. Every $1000
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on the screen= $1.00 to you. Now, you have the opportunity to win as much money as
possible, remembering that the dollar amount you see on the screen will be divided by
1000 and given to you. Say for example, it says you win $500. How much money would
that be to you? Right, 50 cents. (Or No, see, $5000 divided by 10000 is .5, or 50 cents.)
You have the opportunity to double your money or lose all of it. You will not be expected
to pay any money if you go in the hole.
Finally, at the end of the game, your winnings will be tallied. If you win more than
$1500, you will win a cash prize of $5 today in addition to your other winnings.
Are there any questions? Ready? Begin.”
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APPENDIX D

Research Participant Consent Statement
Project Director of Principal Investigator: Emily J. Anderson, MA & Lori Wagner
Title of Project: Gambling Behavior in College Students
You are invited to participate in a research study of gambling behavior. We hope to learn how
college students make judgments when gambling. You were selected to participate in this
study because you are currently enrolled at Binghamton University.
If you decide to participate, we will ask to affix two electrodes to your non-dominant palm to
measure your emotional response to a computerized gambling game. We do not expect for you
to experience any discomfort from this, and you may participate in the study without this
measurement. We will also ask you to fill out two questionnaires. The experiment will take
approximately 30 minutes. There are no anticipated risks. In terms of benefits, you will
receive ½ research credit and possibly some monetary compensation, and we hope, an
informative experience participating in psychological research.
All of the personal and identifying information you provide during this study will be kept
confidential. We will not disclose this information to anyone. Your decision whether or not to
participate will not prejudice your future relations with the Environmental Neuropsychology
Laboratory, or SUNY Binghamton. If you decide to participate, you are free to withdraw your
consent and discontinue participation at any time without prejudice.
Before you sign the form, please ask questions on any aspect of the study that is at all unclear
to you. If you have any additional questions later, Dr. Peter Donovick (777-2852), Emily
Anderson (777-2855), or Lori Wagner (777-2855) will be happy to answer them. If at any time
you have questions concerning your rights as a research subject you may call the Chair of
Binghamton’s Human Subject Research Review Committee, Dr. Gary James, at (607) 7776086. You will be given a copy of this form to keep.
YOU ARE MAKING A DECISION WHETHER OR NOT TO PARTICIPATE. YOUR
SIGNATURE INDICATES THAT YOU HAVE DECIDED TO PARTICIPATE HAVING
READ THE INFORMATION PROVIDED ABOVE.
Date _____________

Time ____________ AM/PM

Signature ______________________________________
Signature of Witness _________________Signature of Investigator ______________

